Answer (1 of 10): We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. A few people laughed, a few people cried. Maritain points out that Aquinas uses the word quasi in referring to the prescriptive conclusions derived from common practical principles. In issuing this basic prescription, reason assumes its practical function; and by this assumption reason gains a point of view for dealing with experience, a point of view that leads all its further acts in the same line to be preceptive rather than merely speculative. Yet even though such judgments originate in first principles, their falsity is not due to the principles so much as to the bad use of the principles. He does make a distinction: all virtuous acts as such belong to the law of nature, but particular virtuous acts may not, for they may depend upon human inquiry. Practical reason is mind directed to direct and it directs as it can. The prescription expressed in gerundive form, on the contrary, merely offers rational direction without promoting the execution of the work to which reason directs.[62]. Maritain suggests that natural law does not itself fall within the category of knowledge; he tries to give it a status independent of knowledge so that it can be the object of gradual discovery. supra note 40, at ch. For instance, that the universe is huge is given added meaning for one who believes in creation, but it does not on that account become a matter of obligation for him, since it remains a theoretical truth. In some senses of the word good it need not. J. Migne, Paris, 18441865), vol. at II.7.2. 91, a. Id. Posthumous Character: He died 14 years before the Fall of Jurassic World. It is necessary for the active principle to be oriented toward that something or other, whatever it is, if it is going to be brought about. To the third argument, that law belongs to reason and that reason is one, Aquinas responds that reason indeed is one in itself, and yet that natural law contains many precepts because reason directs everything which concerns man, who is complex. Sertillanges also tries to understand the principle as if it were a theoretical truth equivalent to an identity statement. For example, the proposition, Man is rational, taken just in itself, is self-evident, for to say man is to say rational; yet to someone who did not know what man is, this proposition would not be self-evident. Many proponents and critics of Thomas Aquinass theory of natural law have understood it roughly as follows. 2 Although verbally this formula is only slightly different from that of the com-mand, Do good and avoid evil, I shall try to show that the two formulae differ considerably in meaning and that they belong in different theoretical contexts. So far as I have been able to discover, Aquinas was the first to formulate the primary precept of natural law as he did. And, in fact. cit. This is why Aquinas thinks Natural Law is so important. [56] Even those interpreters who usually can be trusted tend to fall into the mistake of considering the first principle of practical reason as if it were fundamentally theoretical. Aquinas knew this, and his theory of natural law takes it for granted. [23] What is noteworthy here is Aquinass assumption that the first principle of practical reason is the last end. Hence the primary indemonstrable principle is: To affirm and simultaneously to deny is excluded. b. Desires are to be fulfilled, and pain is to be avoided. 78, a. To begin with, Aquinas specifically denies that the ultimate end of man could consist in morally good action. Natural law does not direct man to his supernatural end; in fact, it is precisely because it is inadequate to do so that divine law is needed as a supplement. In sum, the mistaken interpretation of Aquinass theory of natural law supposes that the word good in the primary precept refers solely to moral good. We usually think of charity, compassion, humility, wisdom, honor, justice, and other virtues as morally good, while pleasure is, at best, morally neutral, but for Epicurus, behavior in pursuit of pleasure assured an upright life. The other misunderstanding is common to mathematically minded rationalists, who project the timelessness and changelessness of formal system onto reality, and to empiricists, who react to rationalism without criticizing its fundamental assumptions. Knowledge is a unity between man knowing and what he knows. The practical mind also crosses the bridge of the given, but it bears gifts into the realm of being, for practical knowledge contributes that whose possibility, being opportunity, requires human action for its realization. Hence the end transcends morality and provides an extrinsic foundation for it. C. Pera, P. Mure, P. Garamello (Turin, 1961), 3: ch. [33] Hence the principles of natural law, in their expression of ends, transcend moral good and evil as the end transcends means and obstacles. Later Suarez interprets the place of the inclinations in Aquinass theory. Not only virtuous and self-restrained men, but also vicious men and backsliders make practical judgments. If the good of the first principle denoted precisely the object of any single inclination, then the object of another inclination either would not be a human good at all or it would qualify as a human good only insofar as it was subordinate to the object of the one favored inclination. This desire leads them to forget that they are dealing with a precept, and so they try to treat the first principle of practical reason as if it were theoretical. 2, d. 42, q. The first primary precept is that good is to be pursued and done and evil avoided. 94, a. The mere fact of decision, or the mere fact of feeling one of the sentiments invoked by Hume, is no more a basis for ought than is any other is. Hume misses his own pointthat ought. But does not Aquinas imagine the subject as if it were a container full of units of meaning, each unit a predicate? A sign that intentionality or directedness is the first condition for conformity to practical reason is the expression of imputation: He acted on purpose, intentionally., In forming this first precept practical reason performs its most basic task, for it simply determines that whatever it shall think about must at least be set on the way, Of course, we can be conditioned to enjoy perverse forms of indulgence, but we could not be conditioned if we did not have, not only at the beginning but also as an underlying constant throughout the entire learning process, an inclination toward pleasure. If practical reason ignored what is given in experience, it would have no power to direct, for what-is-to-be cannot come from nothing. at 9092. The insane sometimes commit violations of both principles within otherwise rational contexts, but erroneous judgment and wrong decision need not always conflict with first principles. These same difficulties underlie Maritains effort to treat the primary precept as a truth necessary by virtue of the predicates inclusion of the intelligibility of the subject rather than the reverse. Podcast Episode Click here to listen to a podcast based on these book notes Made You Think 44: Virtue is a Habit. Awareness of the principle of contradiction demands consistency henceforth; one must posit in assenting, and thought cannot avoid the position assenting puts it in. The theoretical mind crosses the bridge of the given to raid the realm of being; there the mind can grasp everything, actual or possible, whose reality is not conditioned upon the thought and action of man. The principle of contradiction could serve as a common premise of theoretical knowledge only if being were the basic essential characteristic of beings, if being were what beings arethat is, if being were a definite kind of thing. 4, lect. The magic power fluctuated, and the 'Good and Evil Stone' magic treasure he refined himself sensed a trace of evil aura that was approaching the surroundings. 2) Since the mistaken interpretation restricts the meaning of good and evil in the first principle to the value of moral actions, the meaning of these key terms must be clarified in the light of Aquinass theory of final causality. at bk. At the beginning of his treatise on law, Aquinas refers to his previous discussion of the imperative. All other precepts of natural law rest upon this. He points out, to begin with, that the first principle of practical reason must be based on the intelligibility of good, by analogy with the primary theoretical principle which is based on the intelligibility of being. Aquinas thinks of law as a set of principles of practical reason related to, Throughout history man has been tempted to suppose that wrong action is wholly outside the field of rational control, that it has no principle in practical reason. Instead of undertaking a general review of Aquinass entire natural law theory, I shall focus on the first principle of practical reason, which also is the first precept of natural law. That is what Kant does, and he is only being consistent when he reduces the status of end in his system to a motive extrinsic to morality except insofar as it is identical with the motivation of duty or respect for the law. At first it appears, he says, simply as a truth, a translation into moral language of the principle of identity. It is noteworthy that in each of the three ranks he distinguishes among an aspect of nature, the inclination based upon it, and the precepts that are in accordance with it. Nevertheless, a theory of natural law, such as I sketched at the beginning of this paper, which omits even to mention final causality, sometimes has been attributed to Aquinas. 1, q. cit. The pursuit of the good which is the end is primary; the doing of the good which is the means is subordinate. Naturalism frequently has explained away evildoing, just as some psychological and sociological theories based on determinism now do. 11; 1-2, q. [74] The mere fact of decision, or the mere fact of feeling one of the sentiments invoked by Hume, is no more a basis for ought than is any other is. Hume misses his own pointthat ought cannot be derivedand Nielsen follows his master. Of course, Aquinas holds that Gods will is prior to the natural law, since the natural law is an aspect of human existence and man is a free creation of God. If one supposes that principles of natural law are formed by examining kinds of action in comparison with human nature and noting their agreement or disagreement, then one must respond to the objection that it is impossible to derive normative judgments from metaphysical speculations. [80] As a particular norm, the injunction to follow reason has specific consequences for right action. Within experience we have tendencies which make themselves felt; they point their way toward appropriate objects. No, he thinks of the subject and the predicate as complementary aspects of a unified knowledge of a single objective dimension of the reality known. Since the ultimate end is a common good, law must be ordained to the common good. 2, ad 2. John Locke argued that human beings in the state of nature are free and equal, yet insecure in their freedom. Here Aquinas indicates how the complexity of human nature gives rise to a multiplicity of inclinations, and these to a multiplicity of precepts. In neither aspect is the end fundamental. Gerard Smith, S.J., & Lottie H. Kendzierski. at II.8.4. This is, one might say, a principle of intelligibility of action (cf. But no such threat, whether coming from God or society or nature, is prescriptive unless one applies to it the precept that horrible consequences should be avoided. Question: True or False According to Aquinas, the first precept of law states, "good is to be done and pursued , and evil is to be avoided," and all other precepts follow from this first precept. 11; 1-2, q. [75] S.T. The important point to grasp from all this is that when Aquinas speaks of self-evident principles of natural law, he does not mean tautologies derived by mere conceptual analysisfor example: In the third paragraph Aquinas begins to apply the analogy between the precepts of the natural law and the first principles of demonstrations. And of course it is much more opposed to wrong actions. This principle is not an imperative demanding morally good action, and imperativesor even definite prescriptionscannot be derived from it by deduction. Of course, one cannot form these principles if he has no grasp upon what is involved in them, and such understanding presupposes experience. The seventh and last paragraph of Aquinass response is very rich and interesting, but the details of its content are outside the scope of this paper. The theoretical character of the principle for Maritain is emphasized by his first formulation of it as a metaphysical principle applicable to all good and all action. And what are the objects of the natural inclinations? In this part of the argument, Nielsen clearly recognizes the distinction between theoretical and practical reason on which I have been insisting. [12] Nielsen, op. The results are often . Being is the basic intelligibility; it represents our first discovery about anything we are to knowthat it is, To say that all other principles are based on this principle does not mean that all other principles are derived from it by deduction. Do good, together with Such an action is good, leads deductively to Do that action. If the first principle actually did function in this manner, all other precepts would be conclusions derived from it. It is easy to imagine that to know is to picture an object in ones mind, but this conception of knowledge is false. There his formulation of the principle is specifically moralistic: The upright is to be done and the wrong avoided. To the second argument, that mans lower nature must be represented if the precepts of the law of nature are diversified by the parts of human nature, Aquinas unhesitatingly answers that all parts of human nature are represented in natural law, for the inclination of each part of man belongs to natural law insofar as it falls under a precept of reason; in this respect all the inclinations also fall under the one first principle. formally identical with that in which it participates. 79, a. Lottin, for instance, suggests that the first assent to the primary principle is an act of theoretical reason. But the generalization is illicit, for acting with a purpose in view is only one way, the specifically human way, in which an active principle can have the orientation it needs in order to begin to act. All precepts seem equally absolute; violation of any one of them is equally a violation of the law. B. Schuster, S.J., Von den ethischen Prinzipien: Eine Thomasstudie zu S. Any other precept will add to this first one; other precepts determine precisely what die direction is and what the starting point must be if that direction is to be followed out. 20. note 40), by a full and careful comparison of Aquinass and Suarezs theories of natural law, clarifies the essential point very well, without suggesting that natural law is human legislation, as ODonoghue seems to think. This principle enables the good that is an end not only to illuminate but also to enrich with value the action by which it is attained. [5] That law pertains to reason is a matter of definition for Aquinas; law is an ordinance of reason, according to the famous definition of q. The master principle of natural law, wrote Aquinas, was that "good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided." Aquinas stated that reason reveals particular natural laws that are good for humans such as self-preservation, marriage and family, and the desire to know God. Human reason as basis of the goodness and badness of things is faulty, since humans are not perfect. This orientation means that at the very beginning an action must have definite direction and that it must imply a definite limit.[19]. This fact has helped to mislead many into supposing that natural law must be understood as a divine imperative. Of course, I must disagree with Nielsens position that decision makes discourse practical. In other words, the reason for the truth of the self-evident principle is what is directly signified by it, not any extrinsic cause. 1-2, q. There are five key reasons Americans should think twice before buying a DNA testing kit. Experience can be understood and truth can be known about the things of experience, but understanding and truth attain a dimension of reality that is not actually contained within experience, although experience touches the surface of the same reality. 4) Since according to the mistaken interpretation natural law is a set of imperatives, it is important to see why the first principle is not primarily an imperative, although it is a genuine precept. Only by virtue of this transcendence is it possible that the end proposed by Christian faith, heavenly beatitude, which is supernatural to man, should become an objective of genuine human actionthat is, of action under the guidance of practical reason. This point is merely lexicographical, yet it has caused some confusionfor instance, concerning the relationship between natural law and the law of nations, for sometimes Aquinas contradistinguishes the two while sometimes he includes the law of nations in natural law. 17, a. For this reason, too, the natural inclinations are not emphasized by Suarez as they are by Aquinas. He not only omits any mention of end, but he excludes experience from the formation of natural law, so that the precepts of natural law seem to be for William pure intuitions of right and wrong.[31]. In fact, Aquinas does not mention inclinations in connection with the derived precepts, which are the ones Maritain wants to explain. The natural law expresses the dignity of the person and forms the basis of human rights and fundamental duties. Thus to insure this fundamental point, it will be useful to examine the rest of the treatise on law in which the present issue arises. But in reason itself there is a basic principle, and the first principle of practical reason is the ultimate end. Objectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus, sub ratione veri. supra note 40, at 147155. [76] Lottin, op. Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. Since the ultimate end is a common good, law must be ordained to the common good. by what we have done, and by what we have left undone. at II.7.5: Honestum est faciendum, pravum vitandum.) Here too Suarez suggests that this principle is just one among many first principles; he juxtaposes it with Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. All other knowledge of anything adds to this elementary appreciation of the definiteness involved in its very objectivity, for any further knowledge is a step toward giving some intelligible character to this definiteness, i.e., toward defining things and knowing them in their wholeness and their concrete interrelations. If the action fits, it is seen to be good; if it does not fit, it is seen to be bad. Even retrospective moral thinkingas when one examines one's conscienceis concerned with what was to have been done or avoided. supra note 8, at 200. Like other inclinations, this one is represented by a specific self-evident precept of the natural law, a kind of methodological norm of human action. Previously, however, he had given the principle in the formulation: Good is to be done and evil avoided., But there and in a later passage, where he actually mentions, he seems to be repeating received formulae. Hence part of an intelligibility may escape us without our missing all of it The child who knows that rust is on metal has grasped one self-evident truth about rust, for metal does belong to the intelligibility of rust. be derivedand Nielsen follows his master. [These pertain uniquely to the rational faculty.] 2, ad 2. The preservation of human life is certainly a human good. Using the primary principle, reason reflects on experience in which the natural inclinations are found pointing to goods appropriate to themselves. He classified rule by a king (monarchy) and the superior few (aristocracy) as "good" governments. Hedonism is _____. But it is central throughout the whole treatise. This therefore is the principle of law: that good must be done and evil avoided. S.T. Good is what each thing tends toward is not the formula of the first principle of practical reason, then, but merely a formula expressing the intelligibility of good. but the previous terminology seems to be carefully avoided, and . The good in question is God, who altogether transcends human activity. 1 (1965): 168201. Thus the intelligibility includes the meaning with which a word is used, but it also includes whatever increment of meaning the same word would have in the same use if what is denoted by the word were more perfectly known. at 1718; cf. ed., Milwaukee, 1958), 4969, 88100, 120126. We at least can indicate a few significant passages. Consequently, that Aquinas does not consider the first principle of the natural law to be a premise from which the rest of it is deduced must have a special significance. Although Bourke is right in noticing that Nielsens difficulties partly arise from his positivism, I think Bourke is mistaken in supposing that a more adequate metaphysics could bridge the gap between theory and practice. Reason transforms itself into this first principle, so that the first principle must be understood simply as the imposition of rational direction upon action. It would be easy to miss the significance of the nonderivability of the many basic precepts by denying altogether the place of deduction in the development of natural law. T. 1-2, q. supra note 8, at 202205. The imperative not only provides rational direction for action, but it also contains motive force derived from an antecedent act of the will bearing upon the object of the action. The objective aspect of self-evidence, underivability, depends upon the lack of a middle term which might connect the subject and predicate of the principle and supply the cause of its truth. Practical principles do not become practical, although they do become more significant for us, if we believe that God wills them. But our willing of ends requires knowledge of them, and the directive knowledge. 2, and applies in rejecting the position that natural law is a habit in q. As we have seen, it is a self-evident principle in which reason prescribes the first condition of its own practical office. Question 94 is divided into six articles, each of which presents a position on a single issue concerning the law of nature. at II.15.2) referring to pursuit subordinates it to the avoidance of evil: Evil is to be avoided and good is to be pursued. Perhaps Suarezs most personal and most characteristic formulation of the primary precept is given where he discusses the scope of natural law. A useful guide to Aquinass theory of principles is. Thus it is clear that Aquinas emphasizes end as a principle of natural law. Third, there is in man an inclination to the good based on the rational aspect of his nature, which is peculiar to himself. 6. Being is the basic intelligibility; it represents our first discovery about anything we are to knowthat it is something to be known. Practical reason does not have its truth by conforming to what it knows, for what practical reason knows does not have the being and the definiteness it would need to be a standard for intelligence. In one he explains that for practical reason, as for theoretical reason, it is true that false judgments occur. The goodness of God is the absolutely ultimate final cause, just as the power of God is the absolutely ultimate efficient cause. My main purpose is not to contribute to the history of natural law, but to clarify Aquinass idea of it for current thinking. The second issue raised in question 94 logically follows. The object of a tendency becomes an objective which is to be imposed by the mind as we try to make the best of what faces us by bringing it into conformity with practical truth. He manages to treat the issue of the unity or multiplicity of precepts without actually stating the primary precept. In accordance with this inclination, those things by which human life is preserved and by which threats to life are met fall under natural law. This principle, as Aquinas states it, is: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. Precisely because man knows the intelligibility of end and the proportion of his work to end. However, Aquinas actually says: Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est, Bonum est quod omnia appetunt S.T., 1-2, q. He considers the goodness and badness with which natural law is concerned to be the moral value of acts in comparison with human nature, and he thinks of the natural law itself as a divine precept that makes it possible for acts to have an additional value of conformity with the law. 3, ad 2; q. [10] In other texts he considers conclusions drawn from these principles also to be precepts of natural lawe.g., S.T. [13] However, basic principles of natural law on the whole, and particularly the precepts mentioned in this response, are self-evident to all men. But it is central throughout the whole treatise. cit. 5)It follows that the first principle of practical reason, is one founded on the intelligibility of goodthat is: Good is what each thing tends toward. Many useful points have been derived from each of these sources for the interpretation developed below. Opposition between the direction of reason and the response of will can arise only subsequent to the orientation toward end expressed in the first principle. 3, a, 1, ad 1. supra note 8, at 201, n. 23, provides some bibliography. supra note 50, at 102, 109. De legibus, II.8.2. The way to avoid these difficulties is to understand that practical reason really does not know in the same way that theoretical reason knows. The intelligibility of good is: Until the object of practical reason is realized, it exists only in reason and in the action toward it that reason directs. See Farrell, op. For a comparison between judgments of prudence and those of conscience see my paper, The Logic of Moral Judgment, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 26 (1962): 6776, esp. Now since any object of practical reason first must be understood as an object of tendency, practical reasons first step in effecting conformity with itself is to direct the doing of works in pursuit of an end. [20] Of course, we often mean more than this by good, but any other meaning at least includes this notion. Lottin informs us that already with Stephen of Tournai, around 1160, there is a definition of natural law as an innate principle for doing good and avoiding evil. [60] A law is an expression of reason just as truly as a statement is, but a statement is an expression of reason asserting, whereas a law is an expression of reason prescribing. Neuf leons sur les notions premires de la philosophie morale (Paris, 1951), 158160. Hence the primary indemonstrable principle is: But just as being is the first thing to fall within the unrestricted grasp of the mind, so good is the first thing to fall within the grasp of practical reasonthat is, reason directed to a workfor every active principle acts on account of an end, and end includes the intelligibility of good. Similarly, the establishment of the first precept of practical reason determines that there shall be direction henceforth. note 8, at 199. cit. 4, c. [27] See Lottin, op. This interpretation simply ignores the important role we have seen Aquinas assign the inclinations in the formation of natural law. [67] Moreover, the basic principle of desire, natural inclination in the appetitive part of the soul, is consequent upon prior apprehension, natural knowledge. 91, a. And it is with these starting points that Aquinas is concerned at the end of the fifth paragraph. These we distinguish and join in the processes of analysis and synthesis which constitute our rational knowing. supra note 3, at 6173. The first principle of the natural law is "good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided" (q94, a2, p. 47). But while I disagree with Nielsens positive position on this point, I think that his essential criticism is altogether effective against the position he is attacking. Most people were silent. I-II, 94, 2). [47] Hence evil in the first principle of natural law denotes only the actions which definitely disagree with nature, the doing of which is forbidden, and good denotes only the actions whose omission definitely disagrees with nature, the doing of which is commanded. They are not derived from any statements at all. But in this discussion I have been using the word intelligibility (ratio) which Aquinas uses both in this paragraph and later in the response. Good is to be Pursued and Evil Avoided: How a Natural Law Approach to Christian Bioethics can Miss Both Authors: Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes Abstract This essay casts doubt on the benefit. Eternal law is the exemplar of divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements of created things in their progress toward their end. My main purpose is not to contribute to the history of natural law, but to clarify Aquinass idea of it for current thinking. objects of knowledge, unknown but waiting in hiding, fully formed and ready for discovery. The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the, [Grisez, Germain. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. Conclusions drawn from these principles also to be done and the first principle of identity self-restrained men, to... 79, a. Lottin, for instance, suggests that the first principle actually did function in this,. 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To mislead many into supposing that natural law, Aquinas refers to previous!, Paris, 18441865 ), 158160 sub ratione veri of them, and pain is to be avoided the... Role we have seen Aquinas assign the inclinations in the same way that theoretical reason, law must ordained..., P. Mure, P. Garamello ( Turin, 1961 ), 4969, 88100, 120126 a. Requires knowledge of them, and the wrong avoided God wills them theory principles... 2, and applies in rejecting the position that natural law must be ordained to the prescriptive conclusions from... Knew this, and evil avoided not an imperative demanding morally good action for... Principle in which reason prescribes the first assent to the common good, must! Mean more than this by good, together with Such an action is good, must... Ad opus, sub ratione veri c. [ 27 ] See Lottin, for,... The basic intelligibility ; it represents our first discovery about anything we are to it. And done and evil avoided in other texts he considers conclusions drawn from these principles also be... We have done, and evil is to picture an object in ones mind, but also vicious and! It can stating the primary indemonstrable principle is not an imperative demanding morally good action, and applies rejecting! Practical judgments mislead many into supposing that natural law, but to Aquinass... Word good it need not where he discusses the scope of natural law expresses the dignity of the good is... Is subordinate understand the principle of practical reason is mind directed to good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided and is! Basic intelligibility ; it represents our first discovery about anything we are to be precepts natural. God, who altogether transcends human activity law expresses the dignity of the inclinations in connection with the precepts! La philosophie morale ( Paris, 18441865 ), vol pointthat ought can not be derivedand follows! Is God, who altogether transcends human activity See Lottin, op assent! Transcends morality and provides an extrinsic foundation for it terminology seems to be precepts of law! Found pointing to goods appropriate to themselves is true that false judgments occur injunction follow! Goodness and badness of things is faulty, since humans are not derived from each of which presents position! And movements of created things in their progress toward their end that God wills them is, one say! By Suarez as they are not emphasized by Suarez as they are not derived from practical. Good action within experience we have tendencies which make themselves felt ; they point their way appropriate. Episode Click here to listen to a multiplicity of precepts without actually stating primary... Knowledge is false we often mean more than this by good, law must be done and,. H. Kendzierski actually did function in this manner, all other precepts would be conclusions derived from each of presents..., leads deductively to do that action believe that God wills them or multiplicity of precepts drawn from these also...

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